Appeals to the Electorate by Private Businesses: Injury to Competitors and the Right to Petition (Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, E.D. Pa. 1957, 3d Cir. 1959, Cert. Granted, U.S. 1960) by unknown
APPEALS TO THE ELECTORATE BY PRIVATE BUSINESSES:
INJURY TO COMPETITORS AND THE RIGHT
TO PETITION*
EFFORTS by business interests to secure favorable governmental treatment
may inflict hardships upon competitors which cannot adequately be remedied
through conventional forms of relief. Originally attempts to influence govern-
ment took the form of buttonholing legislators, a technique known as direct
lobbying.1 Recent developments in mass communications 2 have added new
grassroots or indirect lobbying techniques to the traditional direct methods.3
Public relations firms skilled in manipulating mass communications media 4
now claim the ability to "engineer the consent" of constituents by creating the
climate of public opinion desired by the firms' clients.0 But the modern public
relations campaign may have two detrimental effects upon the competitors of
the sponsoring business organization. By influencing governmental grants of
*Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768
(E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S.
947 (1960).
1. See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 304, 306 n.12 (1947) and authorities cited therein.
2. 1946 1959
Radio (number receivers) 60,000,000a 146,000,000 b
Television (number sets) 1,720,786 c  52,000,000d
Books (number copies) 487,216 e  959,595e
Newspapers (daily circulation) 50,927,505f 58,604,942g
Periodicals (circulation) 384,688' 449,285 t
Motion pictures (average weekly attendance) 90,000,000i 40,000,000k
Sources: a1947 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 638; b1960 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR
577; eALBIG, MODERN PUBLIC OPINION 51 (1956) (figure for 1949) ; dWoRLD ALMANAC
704 (Hansen ed. 1960) ; e1960 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 523 (figures
for 1947 and 1958 respectively) ; fALBiG, .mpra at 47; g1960 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR
482 (six-month period) ; '1960 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra at 521 (figures for 1947 and
1954 respectively) ; JALBiG, supra at 51 (figure for 1948) ; k1960 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE
YEAR 450 (figure for 1958).
See also ALBiG, MODERN PUBLIC OPINION 43-51 (1956).
3. BLAISDELL, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE 93, 94, 207 (1957) ; ScHanF-
GIESSER, THE LOBBYISTS 229 (1951) ; ZELLER,:AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 215 (1954);
Herring, Lobby, 9 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 565, 567 (1933).
For a -historical survey of lobbying techniques, see H.R. RaP. No. I1W,: 63d Cong.e 2d
Sess. (1913) ; H.R. RaP. Nos. 3137-39, 3232-34, 3238, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951) ; Hear-
ings Before the Special Committee of the Senate To Investigate Political Activities, Lobby-
ing, and Campaign Contributions, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; Comment, 56 YALE L.J.
304, 311-13 (1947) ; SCHRIFTGIESSER, op. cit. supra at 1-76.
4. PIMLOIT, PUBLIC RELATIONS & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 237 (1951); BLAISDELL,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 203-07.
5. See BERNAYS, THE ENGINEERING OF CONSENT 3, 4 (1955); Ross, THE IMAGE
MERCHANTS 117, 118 (1959).
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monopolistic privileges for itself or imposition of burdensome restrictions on
others, a firm can improve its market position at the expense of its rivals.
And even if the attempt to influence government fails, the campaign to dis-
enchant public officials with competitors may impair the competitors' market
position, by casting aspersions on their business reputation. Attempts to obtain
judicial remedies for such injuries must contend both with the prospective
defendant's right to petition the government and with the inadequacy of pres-
ent statutory and common law actions for business defamation.
Past attempts to restrain lobbying campaigns, or to redress injuries caused
by them, have been largely ineffective. To control direct lobbying, registration
and disclosure statutes have been promulgated," on the theory that knowledge
of the real party in interest is an aid in evaluating lobbyist-supplied informa-
tion, and that public opinion, alerted by publicity of registration data, will con-
trol lobbying excesses. 7 But these statutes are easily evaded and frequently not
enforced ;8 moreover, they do not comprehend modern grassroots lobbying
methods. 9 The common law, while it affords no protection against the injurious
effects of direct lobbying, does provide a remedy against false propaganda dis-
seminated in the course of a grassroots program.10 But this remedy, too, is
seldom effective. The action for disparaging the quality of goods is discouraged
by stiff requirements of proof. In addition to overcoming the presumption that
the statements are true "1 and establishing that they were made with an intent
to disparage,' 2 plaintiff must prove special damages-loss of specific sales to
particular customers.' 3 The action for libel or slander of a business reputation
does not require such stringent standards of proof. 14 But this action, as well as
the disparagement action, is not available where a public relations campaign
is conducted against a large number of business firms, because the injury to
6. Thirty-one states, see Zeller, Regulation of Pressure Groups and Lobbyists, Annals,
Sept. 1958, pp. 94, 95, and the federal government, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act,
60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958), have adopted such statutes.
7. BLAISDELL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 84.
8. Kennedy, Congressional Lobbies: A Chronic Problem Reexamined, 45 GEo. L.J.
535, 538-39, 555 (1957) ; ZELLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 236; Note, 47 COLUM. L. PEv. 98,
101-02 (1947) ; Conmnent, 56 YALE L.J. 304, 315 (1947) ; ScHRIrraIESSER, op. cit. stepra
note 3, at 91-102, 161.
9. ZELLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 224; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 555. But see sug-
gestions that registration statutes be extended to cover indirect lobbying, ZELLER, op. Cit.
supra note 3, at 238; U.S. PRESIDENT'S CoMMrr ON CrviL RIGHTS, To SEcuRE THESE
RIGHTS 164 (1947).
10. See 1 HARPuER & JAMES, ToRTs §§ 6.1-6.4 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER &
JAMEs] ; PROSSaR, TORTS § 108 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as PRossER] ; 3 RESTATE-
mENT, ToRTs §§ 624-52 (1938) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
11. 1 HARPER & JAMES § 6.1 at 481; PROSSER § 108 at 764; 3 RESTATEMENT § 634.
12. 1 HARPER & JA E S § 6.1 at 480 ("lack of privilege") ; PRossER § 108 at 765 ("in-
tent to disparage") ; 3 RESTATEMENT §§ 625, 628.
13. PROSSER § 108 at 765-67; 3 RESTATEMENT § 633. But see 1 HARPER & JAMES § 6.1
at 480 n.33.
14. 1 HARPER & JAMES § 6.1 at 481; 3 RESTATEMENT § 139 at 323.
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each individual is presumed to be slight; recovery is denied even when the
losses of the group as a whole can be shown. 15
Apart from these private remedies, acts of business defamation are pro-
scribed by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares
"unfair methods of competition" unlawful.16 Upon receipt of a private com-
plaint, or on its own initiative,17 the Federal Trade Commission may investi-
gate,'8 hold hearings,19 and, if the conduct complained of is deemed violative
of the Act, issue a cease and desist order.20 In the exercise of its authority to
define unfair methods of competition, the Commission has ordered many busi-
ness firms to cease and desist from disparaging their competitors.21 The Com-
mission cannot act, however, unless a proceeding to curb the propaganda cam-
paign is found to be "in the public interest. '22 Even where this requirement is
met, private interests do not receive adequate protection, for the Commission
is not authorized to award damages for injuries sustained,23 and the threat of
the cease and desist order alone seems an ineffective deterrent to potential
violators of the act.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference24
marks the first attempt by a private group to invoke the Sherman Act against
derogatory propaganda campaigns. Prior to 1955, the state of Pennsylvania
was a centrally located barrier to the growth of long distance trucking in the
eastern states; unlike the other states in the area, where trucks were permitted
15. See Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 263-66 (1950); Annot., 97
A.L.R. 281 (1935).
16. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
17. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-1.15 (1960).
18. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.31-1.42 (1960).
19. 16 C.F.R. § 1.34 (1960).
20. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
21. Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 686 (8th Cir. 1926); Perma-Maid
Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795
(2d Cir. 1942); E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 1944). But see
Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49, 51 (6th Cir. 1928) (occasional disparaging
statements not substantial evidence of an unfair method of competition) ; John Bene & Sons
v. FTC, 299 Fed. 468 (2d Cir. 1924) (public has no interest in protecting product from
truthful disparagement) ; Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941) (dis-
paraging party only expressing an opinion not motivated by profit motive). For a sum-
mary of the Commission's action in disparagement complaints, see 2 TnAaE REG. REP. 5055
(1960).
22. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958) ; accord, FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S.
19, 27-30 (1929).
23. Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 5201.451 (D. Tex. 1942);
L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Labell, Inc., 1953 Trade Cas. f[ 67618 (E.D. Pa. 1953),
rcv'd on other grounds, 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
24. 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. granted, 362 U.S. 947 (1960). Earlier opinions dealing with preliminary matters
appear at 113 F. Supp. 737, 14 F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1953), and 19 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Pa.
1956) ; the opinion setting forth plaintiff's relief is found at 166 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa.
1958).
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to operate at a maximum weight limit of 60,000 pounds, Pennsylvania had
established a 45,000 pound limit,2 5 at which level long distance trucking could
not operate at maximum efficiency. Despite this competitive disadvantage, the
truckers' share of the long distance transportation market had been steadily
increasing, largely at the expense of the railroads. Nevertheless, in 1951 the
Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association (PMTA) sponsored a bill designed
to increase the truck weight limit to 60,000 pounds.26 Determined to stem fur-
ther inroads into the railroads' traditional share of the transportation market,
the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference (ERPC) employed Carl Byoir &
Associates,2 7 a public relations firm, to conduct a propaganda campaign against
the proposed legislation. The Byoir organization prepared propaganda materials
-polls and surveys showing popular opposition to the bill, computations demon-
strating that truckers did not bear their fair share of state and federal taxes,
pictures of tragic highway accidents implying that truck drivers were reckless,
and a motion picture illustrating the damage done to roads by heavy trucks.
This material, in the form of ready-made editorials, articles, press releases, and
speeches opposing the bill, was given to newspaper editors, magazine writers,
radio and television commentators, civic leaders, and local officials. Similar
materials were distributed to organizations such as the Pennsylvania State
Association of Township Supervisors and the Pennsylvania Grange, who were
persuaded to adopt the railroads' position. In most cases, Byoir utilized the
third party technique, a device for distributing materials through dummy or-
ganizations to mask the true source of the propaganda. 28 The PMTA responded
with a public relations campaign of its own.
Despite these activities the weight limit proposal was accepted by the legis-
lature during its 1952 session. But following an executive hearing, which was
essentially a capsule presentation of both public relations campaigns, the gov-
ernor vetoed the bill.
The trucking companies then sought judicial relief. Twenty-four eastern rail-
roads, the ERPC, and Carl Byoir & Associates were joined as defendants.
25. State governments may regulate the weight of vehicles using the public highways
even if the effect is to favor one form of transportation. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374,
394 (1932). See also HARPER, EcoNomIc REGULATION OF THE MOTOR TRUCKING INDUSTRY
BY THE STATES 32-40 (1959).
26. S.B. 615, 139th Pa. Gen. Ass., 2 LEGIs. J. 1997 (1951).
27. See Carl Byoir & Associates: Third-Party Technicians, in Ross, THE IMAGE
MERCHANTS ch., 7,(1959)..
28. Although the railroads themselves had used this technique since the 1930's, S. REP.
No. 26, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 67-69 (1941), public relations firms have become
specialists in its use, Ross, op. cit. supra note 27, at 118, either in aiding their clients' efforts
to receive favorable legislative treatment, see, e.g, KELLEY, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND POUT-
ICAL POWER 79-82 (1956) (account of A.M.A.'s program against national health insur-
ance), or to establish favorable relations with their business contacts, see, e.g., United
States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 673 (E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd,
173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949) (attempt to persuade agricultural producers to sell to defend-
ant).
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The truckers grounded their action on the theory that the public relations cam-
paign violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 declares "Every
contract, combination .... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce"
illegal, and section 2 punishes "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several states."2 9 Strongly condemning defendants'
use of the third party propaganda technique, the district court found two vio-
lations of the Act-the destruction of "business good will of the long-distance
truckers" with the shipping public, and the imposition of "burdensome govern-
mental restrictions and taxes." In addition to enjoining further use of the
third party technique, the court also enjoined any attempt to disseminate
material derogatory to the truckers, suggesting that destruction of good will
violates the Sherman Act whether or not the relationship between the inter-
ested party and the propaganda is concealed. The injunction permitted the
defendants to seek to influence legislation which would impose restrictions on
plaintiffs' business, but only if the support were openly made in the name of the
railroads.30 The court awarded treble damages of eighteen cents to each trucker-
plaintiff, and treble damages of $652,074 plus $200,000 for counsel fees to the
PMTA. The Third Circuit, Chief Judge Biggs dissenting, affirmed the district
court's decision in a short per curiam opinion which merely reiterated the trial
court's conclusions of law.31 The Supreme Court has granted defendants' peti-
tion for certiorari.
32
In discussing the first violation, the district court failed explicitly to define
"business good will."'3 3 The accounting concept-an asset value representing
profit-earning potential acquired in the purchase of a going concern 34-is not
relevant in this context, since "good will" damages were awarded to only the
29. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958). Although the court
rejected the railroads' charge that the truckers had brought suit for publicity purposes,
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 807,
808 (E.D. Pa. 1957), public relations firms sometimes do work closely with the legal coun-
sel of parties to antitrust actions, Hill, Corporation Lawyers & Public Relations Coutsel,
14 Bus. LAv. 587, 608 (1959).
30. The injunction is printed in Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference, 166 F. Supp. 163, 170-73 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
31. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d 218
(3d Cir. 1959).
32. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 362 U.S. 947
(1960). For a colorful exposition of the Noerr facts see Bendiner, The 'Engineering of
Consent'-A Case Study, Reporfer, Aug. 11, 1955, p. 14.
33. Apparently the court used the term "good will" in two ways: enjoyment of a good
business reputation among truck users, and enjoyment of a good reputation in the eyes of
the public. See Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d
218, 229 (3d Cir. 1959) (Biggs, C.J., dissenting) interpreting the trial court's use of the
term in Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp.
768, 810-11 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
34. PATON, EsSENTmIAS OF AccOUNTING 545 (1938). For a history of legal interpre-
tations of good will, see YANG, GooD WMI AND OTHER INTANGIBLEs 26-29 (1927).
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truckers' association,3 5 and an association of firms can have no self-generated,30
collective 37 goodwill. By equating destruction of good will with injury to the
truckers' public reputation the court appears to have meant defamation, which
at common law would comprise the tort of disparagement.38 Prior to the Noerr
decision, no appellate court had decided whether particular acts of defamation
constituted a violation of the Sherman Act.3 9 Four district courts have con-
sidered this question, reaching conflicting results. Two courts denied a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim; one reasoned that "concert of action"
intended to reduce a competitor's business was sufficiently anticompetitive to
constitute a violation,40 and the other interpreted disparaging newspaper ad-
vertisements as a "primary boycott" apparently because they dissuaded poten-
tial customers from doing business with plaintiff.4 ' In two other cases similar
actions were dismissed, on the ground that plaintiff's injury was a "private
wrong . . . remedial in some other court ' 4 2 and because defendant's conduct
was no more than "'unfair competition' in the moral sense as defined in sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act .... "43 But all four courts, un-
duly preoccupied with the usual forms of and remedies for business defamation,
neglected to consider the real issue-whether all requisite elements of a Sher-
man Act violation had been alleged. While the Noerr court ignored these de-
cisions, it did attempt to analyze the defamation charge in terms of Sherman
Act requisites.
The court did not expressly indicate which section of the Sherman Act had
been violated.44 Since there is no discussion in the opinion of section 2 con-
siderations-relevant market, intent to monopolize, or a dangerous probability
of monopoly 45--that the court considered section 2 violated is unlikely.40 Thus
35. Individual trucker plaintiffs stipulated that their only damages were those arising
from the vetoed weight limit law, thus precluding individual relief for loss of good will. 155
F. Supp. at 818.
36. See PATON, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 404-06 (1941).
37. 1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARS § 13 (4th ed. 1947).
38. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
39. Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1956). The
Supreme Court has held that co-operative advertising by competitors is a trade association
activity not ordinarily violative of the Sherman Act. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563, 566 (1925) ; see AGNEW, COOPERATIVE ADVaTISING BY COMPETITORS
vii-viii (1926).
40. Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. Cowan Publishing Corp., 130 F. Supp. 326, 328 (S.D.
N.Y. 1955).
41. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274,
282-83 (D. Mont. 1958).
42. Swartz v. Forward Ass'n, 41 F. Supp. 294, 296 (D. Mass. 1941).
43. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahoghany Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 450, 456 (D. Del. 1940),
rev'd on other grounds, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1942).
44. See Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d
218, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion).
45. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 10-13 (1955).
46. But see 273 F.2d at 222 n.5. Even if the Noerr court had § 2 in mind, defendants'
conduct was not a violation because there was neither evidence of sufficient monopoly
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the decision must be grounded on a violation of section 1, which requires proof
that a contract, combination, or conspiracy unreasonably restrains trade and
causes private injury.47 In this event, however, it is probably incorrect. The
multi-entity nature of defendants' activities satisfied the contract, combination,
or conspiracy requirement of section 1.4 8 But no undue restraint (public in-
jury) 49 was present. While the court spoke in terms of increased costs to ship-
pers, the record apparently fails to support this finding.r0 Moreover, even if
there had been a price increase, it probably would not have constituted a public
injury; truck rates are controlled by a government commission rather than
competitive market forces, and the Supreme Court has stated that the Sher-
man Act was intended only to prevent injury to competition. 51 Furthermore,
the Noerr court's finding of private injury, based on plaintiffs' expenditure on
power "to have an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise to deprive purchasers or
consumers of the advantages which they derive from free competition," Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940), nor a "dangerous probability" of such a monopoly,
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
47. VAN CIsE, op. cit. supra note 45, at 5-10.
48. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 196 n.3 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958) ; Avr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 30-42 (1955).
But on the unimportance of conspiracy in a Sherman Act violation, see Note, The Mature
of a Sherman Act Conspiracy, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 1108, 1127 (1954).
49. The test for an unreasonable restraint on trade is identical with the requirement
that the public be injured. Compare Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) :
The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or other-
wise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and
services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury.
with id. at 500, 501:
Restraints on competition or on the course of trade in the merchandising of articles
moving in interstate commerce is not enough, unless the restraint is shown to have
. an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise to deprive purchasers or con-
sumers of the advantages they derive from free competition.
Thus, when a restraint such as a group boycott is held unreasonable per se, the existence
of a public injury may without proof be assumed a consequence of the restraint. Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959) ; 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 1090,
1091.
50. While the Noerr court cited extensively to the record in support of its other find-
ings, such references are conspicuously absent from its finding on this point. 155 F. Supp.
at 818, 819.
51. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940). In applying the antitrust
laws to regulated industries, a court will subject all matters not covered by the regulatory
statute to the operation of the antitrust laws. S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d
658, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1951); A yr'v GEN. NAT'L. CoIm. ANTITRUST REP. 282 (1955).
But cf. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945); United States v. Borden
Co., 308 U.S. 188, 196-98, 206 (1939).
Both railroad and motor carrier rates are regulated pursuant to federal statute. 49 Stat.
558 (1935), as amended, 54 Stat. 924 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 316 (1958) (motor carriers);
24 Stat. 384 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) (railroads).
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public relations services designed to restore its good will,52 represents a de-
parture from the conventional antitrust principle that private injury means
loss of profits.53
These shortcomings, however, are peculiar to the Noerr case. In other situa-
tions, private antitrust actions could conceivably be of assistance to businesses
injured by a defamatory conspiracy. Unlike the common law remedies, proof
of private injury under the Sherman Act requires no showing of special dam-
ages.54 And unlike the FTC remedy, a private antitrust action would hold
forth ample monetary relief; furthermore, it would not require a showing of
"public interest" in order to bring suit.15 The greatest handicap in using the
Sherman Act will be the necessity of proving unreasonable restraint on com-
petition (public injury). Unless plaintiff can prove a reasonable probability
that he, as a competitor, will be driven out of the market or that consumers
will be injured,5 6 his cause of action will fail. The difficulty of assessing the
52. 155 F. Supp. at 819-20.
53. Injury to a person's business or property, a requirement of private Sherman Act
recoveries, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958), usually means loss of profits either
due to decreased sales, Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176, 182 (E.D.
Tenn. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941), or increased costs, Loder v.
Jayne, 142 Fed. 1010 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 149 Fed. 21 (3d Cir. 1906). See
generally Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 262-66 (1946). But in Noerr no
lost profits were proved. While plaintiffs' public relations costs did increase, there was no
evidence that the increases were required to maintain sales. Such expenditures, upon which
recovery was based, could well have been directed toward influencing passage of a truck-
weight-limit-increase bill.
Moreover, while an association engaged in a business does have a right to preserve its
own business against unlawful anticompetitive practices, American Cooperative Serum
Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1946), an association not en-
gaged in business cannot recover for injuries to the individual business of members, Farmers
Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Alabama Inde-
pendent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939).
Since in Noerr plaintiff PMTA, an association acting as a mere conduit for members' pub-
lic relations expenditures, had no business or property interest in the trucking industry's
good will apart from the good will of each member, the Association had no standing to
claim injury to itself.
54. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379
(1927).
55. See 2 TRADE REG. RaP. 1 9009 (June 6, 1960) (wherein elements of private Sher-
man Act action are summarized). Neither here, nor in the statute authorizing private en-
forcement, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958), is there any public
interest requirement.
56. See notes 46 supra and 78 infra; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493
(1940).
For a discussion of the need to establish a uniform state law of unfair competition, see
Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. Rav. 583 (1953).
For an attempt to establish a similar federal law, see H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), discussed in O'Brien, The Travails of a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 15
Bus. LAw. 279, 286-87 (1960). The proposed federal law apparently utilizes the pre-Erie
federal common law of unfair competition, Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. Rav.
175 (1936), as well as permitting classification of other practices as unfair competitive
methods.
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deleterious effects of business defamation might render this requirement a sub-
stantial bar to private antitrust suits.
A more satisfactory remedy, therefore, would be a cause of action which
recognizes defamation itself as the wrong. Such actions could avoid the difficul-
ties encountered by resort to remedies which, because they serve other policies,
impose burdensome requirements on plaintiff unrelated to the merits of his basic
claim to relief.
This might best be accomplished by allowing the private litigant a right of
action under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. While that act
does not explicitly authorize private civil litigation, amendment or judicial con-
struction to allow private litigation seems necessary to achieve completely the
policy embodied in the act's general declaration that unfair methods of com-
petition are unlawful.57 Unless such litigation is permitted, the general declara-
tion will be meaningless in all cases where the Federal Trade Commission can-
not act because the public interest requirement is unfulfilled.58 The action could
be based on the principles developed by the federal appellate courts in Federal
Trade Commission cases interpreting disparagement as an unfair method of
competition. 9 As in the common law disparagement action, plaintiff would
have to prove the falsity of defendant's statements ;60 on the other hand, the
common law requirement of proving special damages would probably be re-
laxed.1 And neither the public interest requirement, nor the Sherman Act's
"public injury" requirement would complicate plaintiff's suit. Like the Sher-
man Act, however, compensatory or possibly punitive damages in suits by in-
57. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958) ("Unfair methods
of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful.").
58. See Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HAgv. L. Rnv. 987 (1949)
(citing examples). For an example of judicial construction of a private right of action
under a statute not specifically providing for it, see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73
F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). But cf. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214
F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954).
59. See note 21 supra.
60. The Federal Trade Commission has apparently assumed the burden of proving the
falsity of defendants' disparaging statements, see, e.g., Federal Trade Commission com-
plaint in Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 686 (8th Cir. 1926). Application of
Federal Trade Commission case law would exonerate defendant of liability if he proved
his allegedly defamatory statements true, a defense apparently not available under the
Noerr-Sherman-Act interpretation. Compare Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49,
52 (6th Cir. 1928) ("[Defendant's statement] was true, and we know of no standard of
practice which forbids the telling of the truth, even about a competitor."), with Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 838 (E.D.
Pa. 1957). But see Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 YALE L.J.
1304 (1938).
61. The federal courts will probably follow some states in relaxing the requirement of
proof of loss of specific sales by allowing plaintiff to show a general decline in his business
unattended by causes other than defendant's disparagement. See 1 HaPM & JA ss § 6.1
at 480 n.33; e.g., Rochester Brewing Co. v. Certo Bottling Works, 80 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup.
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dividuals or small groups could be made available.62 And while a trade asso-
ciation whose members had been disparaged could probably not recover dam-
ages for their individual injuries,6 3 the association could obtain an injunction
against a continuing trade libel, a remedy not available in many common law
jurisdictions.64
As the second ground for its decision, the Noerr court found defendants'
"fomentation of government restrictions and taxes" on plaintiffs' business a
violation of the Sherman Act.65 Aside from the fundamental question whether
lobbying as conducted in this case was an illegal activity, this decision was
defective in two immediate respects. First, there was no proof of injury or
threatened injury to plaintiffs, a requirement of the private Sherman Act
action. The Noerr court itself apparently recognized this deficiency when it
relied on the principle that a validly promulgated governmental act can cause
no legal injury ;66 although it awarded nominal damages, 7 the award seems
inconsistent with acceptance of this principle. Second, even if the court had
found that the veto injured plaintiffs, it could not have imposed liability unless
it also had found that defendants' propaganda activities caused the veto. To
make this causal connection, however, the court would have had to examine
the governor's motives for vetoing the bill; for if the governor had based his
decision only upon facts and policies relevant to truck weight limits, defend-
ants' defamatory lobbying caused no injury. The court must have found, there-
fore, that the governor was influenced by propaganda, and that he made a
wrong decision, or at least a decision not based on all the facts. The district
judge in Noerr, although later disavowing an examination of the governor's
motives, 68 initially suggested that such examination was permissible, relying
heavily upon Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry.6 9 In Angle plaintiff alleged
injury on the ground that defendant's tortious conduct had caused the Wis-
consin legislature to cancel a railroad-building contract and land grant. Defend-
ant's conduct was divisible into two categories: its agents had destroyed plain-
tiff's ability to complete the contract by such acts as bribing his workmen and
discouraging his financial supporters; second, they had communicated false in-
formation to the legislature. The Supreme Court, itself disavowing an exami-
Ct. 1948). Compare the Supreme Court's requirement of proof in Sherman Act recoveries,
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927) ("[A]
defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise
damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured
with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible.").
62. 2 Nims, UNFAIR CoMPETrrION & TRADEMARKS § 423 (4th ed. 1947).
63. See note 53 supra.
64. Compare Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227, 228-32 (3d Cir. 1941),
with id. at 232-37 (3d Cir. 1942) (rehearing).
65. 166 F. Supp. at 172.
66. 155 F. Supp. at 834.
67. 166 F. Supp. at 173.
68. 155 F. Supp. at 822.
69. 151 U.S. 1 (1893).
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nation of legislative motives under the rule of Fletcher v. Peck,70 made find-
ings that both the destruction of plaintiff's business and the false representa-
tions had caused the government action.7 ' Defendant's wrong was described as
"[placing plaintiff] in a position which apparently called for the action of the
legislature," 72 a form of words emphasized in the Noerr opinion.
In Angle, however, the causal connection between the government's act and
defendant's torts was established by the virtual absence of an alternative gov-
ernmental motive or intervening cause. Plaintiff's inability to perform his con-
tract seems certain to have been a cause of the legislature's action, because, on
the basis of conventional administrative and business considerations, legisla-
tures generally revoke contracts when performance is not forthcoming. Even
here, the existence of an intervening cause was not impossible; the legislature
might have decided, coincidentally, that the railroad was unnecessary. But
when the probabilities of causal effect are extremely high, the court may be
justified in violating the sanctity of governmental motives, in recognition of
the fact that some injurious governmental acts are a predictable and in many
ways automatic response to situations created by private wrongs. The causal
significance of defendant's false representations to the legislature must be
assessed in the light of the unusual facts of the Angle case. The Court found
that the erroneous information had been transmitted by bribed officers of the
contractor and that "on the strength of these representations the legislature,
without inquiry or hearing,... hurriedly passed an act forfeiting and revoking
the grant. '7 3 Although the effect of misleading information upon any govern-
mental decision is perhaps too speculative to sustain judicial scrutiny, the
apparent absence of contrary evidence before the legislature and the surface
probity of the false representations created, in this case, a higher than normal
probability of causal effect.
The false representation in Angle is perhaps analogous to the defamatory
lobbying campaign in Noerr, but the probability of causal effect was far less.
The entire campaign over truck weight limits was vigorously contested, and
the governor acted only after an adversary hearing in which witnesses favor-
able to plaintiffs outnumbered those in opposition. 74 Investigation of the gov-
ernor's motives in such circumstances would be entirely speculative. Thus, the
court could not reasonably find that the defamatory lobbying had had any
causal connection to the governmental restrictions suffered by plaintiff.7 5
70. Id. at 18-19, quoting from Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
71. 151 U.S. at 9, 24-25.
72. Id. at 20, quoted with emphasis in 155 F. Supp.. at 821.
73. 151 U.S. at 9.
74. See Appellant's Brief, p. 72 n.65, Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presi-
dents Conference, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959).
75. But sec United States v. Association of Am. R.R., 4 F.R.D. 510, 527 (D.C. Neb.
1945) (court denies motion to strike complaint paragraph alleging defendants' "fostering
the enactment of state laws restrictive upon competitive methods of transportation" in Sher-
man Act suit); Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J.
1952). The district court also cited Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322
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Moreover, the basic element of the "fomentation" violation-that defendants'
attempt to secure legislation injurious to competitors was unlawful-seems in-
supportable. The first amendment right of petition would seem to guarantee the
right to lobby, subject only to the requirements of lobbying registration statutes.
The manner in which the district court avoided this mandate is not dear. On
the one hand, it seemed to invoke the illegal purpose doctrine, under which an
act otherwise lawful is unlawful if done in furtherance of a conspiracy with an
unlawful purpose. 6 Reasoning that defendants' ultimate purpose was "destruc-
tion" of the plaintiffs' business, 7 an undertaking proscribed by section 1 of
the Sherman Act,78 the court seemed to conclude that their lobbying activities
were likewise unlawful. But the illegal purpose doctrine has been held inappli-
cable to lobbying activity. The Noerr court supported its conspiracy theory by
reference to Sherman Act cases involving price-fixing,79 destruction of a com-
petitor,80 and refusal to deal 8 1-traditional forms of anticompetitive behavior
where defendants' alleged purpose was to benefit from a monopoly established
and maintained privately. The Noerr situation is fundamentally different, be-
cause defendants sought to benefit from a governmentally created monopoly.
The power of the state to create monopolies cannot be challenged under the
Sherman Act.8 2 Private efforts to bring about the exercise of this power have
U.S. 238 (1944) in support of its finding on this point. In Hazel Atlas the Supreme Court
reversed a decision in which a misrepresented report figured as evidence. But judicial re-
view hardly seems analogous to the Noerr inquiry because the very purpose of appellate
courts is to examine the proceedings of the courts below.
The district court's use of Hazel Atlas suggests that a slightly different theory of lia-
bility may have been used in Noerr. Hazel Atlas might be regarded as a case turning on
the absence of a fair hearing. Perhaps the Noerr court believed that defendants had de-
prived the truckers of a fair legislative hearing. But even conceding this point, the court
must still find a causal connection between the offense and the injurious veto.
76. The King v. Jones, 4 B. & Ad. 344, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (K.B. 1832). For the
development of the doctrine, as well as a criticism of it, see Goldstein, Conspiracy to De-
fraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 415-17 (1959).
77. 155 F. Supp. at 809.
78. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1940).
79. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (circumstantial evi-
dence of uniform pricing policies by three tobacco companies sufficient to prove monopoli-
zation).
80. Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1952)
(allegation that defendants attempted to drive plaintiff out of business by, inter alia, dis-
seminating false and misleading propaganda)."
81. Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 144 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Ill. 1956). (allegation
that defendants closed to plaintiffs and -everyone except one defendant competitibn in
Chicago's baggage transfer business upheld as Sherman Act violation). In relying on
Parmele for authority the Noerr court in effect relied upon itself because Parmelee, de-
cided in 1956, cited for its authority a 1953 Noerr decision upholding the trucker-plaintiffs'
complaint against defendants' failure-to-state-a-claim motion. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 113 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
82. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). State licensing provisions granting licensees
the exclusive privilege of piloting ships, Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), or trans-
mitting radio-telegraph messages, Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 68 App. D.C. 336, 97
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similarly been immunized. As the Supreme Court said in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., "it is a contradiction in terms to say that... it is un-
lawful to persuade a sovereign power to bring about a result that it declares
by its conduct to be desirable and proper."' 3
The court itself seemed to recognize this shortcoming. If illegal purpose
were the critical factor in the lobbying violation, the proper relief would have
been a decree enjoining all lobbying with the illegal purpose. Instead, the court
enjoined only lobbying by means of the third party technique, expressly per-
mitting defendants to campaign for antitrucker legislation if they did so under
their own name. 4 Thus the decree, and some portions of the opinion, 5 suggest
that lobbying for monopolistic privileges becomes a Sherman Act violation
only when carried out anonymously.
Penalties visited upon indirect or grassroots lobbying because of its anony-
mity may represent an intrusion upon the first amendment rights of free speech
and petition. The Noerr court likened indirect lobbying to picketing,8 6 limited
F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938), or practicing medicine, Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp.
894 (D. Md. 1956), have been held not violative of the Sherman Act. State awards of in-
surance contracts, Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957), or state laws fixing automobile liability insurance
rates, North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961 (E.D.
Ark. 1949), have also been unsuccessfully challenged, although care is taken that legitimate
state action is involved, Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1959).
The cases on whether an administrative commission's approval of an act gives it anti-
trust immunity appear in conflict. Compare Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156
(1922), and Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 68 App. D.C. 336, 97 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1938), and Western Union Div., Commercial Telegraphers' Union, AFL v. United States,
87 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1949), with Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Aircoach Transp. Ass'n,
105 App. D.C. 381, 253 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
83. 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909) (opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes). Contrary to the Noerr
court's interpretation, 155 F. Supp. at 824, neither United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274
U.S. 268 (1927) nor Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) question the validity
of this principle, for both cases attack the alternative holding in American Banana.
In the recent Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954), indistinguishable on its facts from Noerr, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed this position, holding that defendant's use of various methods, including propa-
ganda, to induce a state highway department to deny plaintiff permission to use a highway
right of way for his powerlines was not a violation of the Sherman Act.
In United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 558-60 (1939), the Supreme Court
held that propaganda tactics by an association of dairies intended to influence the votes of
milk producers in an election which resulted in an administrative order favorable to the
association were not violative of the Sherman Act.
84. 166 F. Supp. at 172.
85. True, one phase of the activities was of a legislative nature-but a rather new
approach to legislation, to say the least.
155 F. Supp. at 814.
86. 155 F. Supp. at 826-27, citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949) (injunction on picketing pursuant to Missouri restraint of trade law upheld).
The Noerr court also relied on Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643,
665, 666 (8th Cir. 1957), wherein defendant's local monopoly of news media was held a
19601
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
governmental regulation of which has been held constitutional. But picketing
is speech plus the act of patrolling the picket line, and may involve action
irrespective of the ideas disseminated; this possibility of action justifies the
regulation. 7 The defendant railroads appealed to the public only by conven-
tional forms of speech, without any act; thus, the court's specific analogy is
inapplicable.88 In two instances the Supreme Court has avoided deciding
whether governmental requirement of disclosure with respect to indirect lobby-
ing is constitutional by construing disclosure or registration requirements to
apply only in the case of direct or buttonhole lobbying.8 9 By implying that ex-
tension of the registration provisions of the Federal Registration of Lobbying
Act to indirect lobbying would have been unconstitutional, a minority in the
second of these cases, United States v. Harriss, suggests that there is a mantle
of anonymity over indirect lobbying activities.90 The Noerr court of appeals
decision, stating as a general rule that the third party technique is contrary to
public policy,91 seems to have overlooked this objection.
Arguably, the indirect lobbyist should not be entitled to anonymity. A public
informed of the sources of propaganda can better evaluate the facts and figures
disseminated because the identity of the interest groups often indicates their
reputation for veracity.92 A nom de plume which has a favorable connotation,
such as "Citizens Foundation for Good Government," will induce the citizenry
to attach an undeserved positive value to the propaganda. And even a neutral
signature, like "Publius," will eliminate the negative value which might be at-
tached to the propaganda were the reader aware of the pressure group's spon-
Sherman Act violation. But that case facilitated freer expression of divergent view points.
See Celler, Pressure Groups in Congress, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 1, 9.
87. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950) ("The loyalties and
responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by
printed word."). See also Samoff, Picketing and the First Amendment: "Full Circle" and
"Formal Surrender," 9 LA. L.J. 889 (1958).
88. Even union member solicitations, an activity factually analogous to organizational
picketing, is held legally distinct from picketing, thereby invoking the first amendment's
protection against state solicitor-registration requirements. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945).
89. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (propaganda distributing official held
not required to disclose names of purchasers to congressional committee) ; United States
v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ("indirect" lobbying registration requirements of Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act read to mean indirect direct lobbying, e.g., soliciting letters
to Congressmen).
90. 347 U.S. 612, 631-33, 635, 636 (1954). See also Celler, Pressure Groups in Con-
gress, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 1, 8. The Court's distinction between direct and indirect lobby-
ing is reasonable. Having close contact with legislators, the direct lobbyist is in a position
to bribe or otherwise corrupt them and to misrepresent the identity and number of his
backers. Cf. Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). But the
indirect lobbyist's efforts must first meet with public acceptance before they can be effective.
91. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d 218,
220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1959).
92. See note 98 infra.
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sorship. 3 But anonymity may be a substantial aid to the communication of
ideas, especially where disclosure of their source would invoke unreasonable
prejudices, causing indifference or premature rejection. Subsequent to Noerr
and Harriss, the Supreme Court has recognized a right of anonymity in three
nonlobbying cases, two protecting membership lists of minority group organi-
zations from state disclosure requirements,94 the other striking down a muni-
cipal ordinance requiring that the names of leaflet writers or publishers appear
on their products.95 The Court's theory in these cases was that a speaker's right
to remain anonymous may be necessary to remove deterrents to free expres-
sion, such as the fear of reprisal.96 This theory may apply to indirect lobbying,
for the same deterrents exist when persons seek to influence legislation. While
the corporation pursuing its economic interest will have little to fear from
reprisal and other external forces,97 the need to disclose identity may discour-
age expression by reducing the likelihood of a fair hearing. On balance, the
disadvantage of anonymous propaganda is the unsure probative value of facts,
a defect which can be remedied by consultation of alternative sources, given a
model electorate inclined and willing to make the effort. The advantage gained
would be to neutralize some of those prejudices which impair the electorate's
ability to render a fair judgment of opinions.98
93. State court pronouncements of the constitutionality of statutes requiring that the
names of persons responsible for election circulars appear on their publications are based
on this reasoning. See State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 319, 55 P.2d 362, 365 (1936) :
The estimate and regard or lack of regard in which the person or persons responsible
for such publications are held by the public is often as effective in determining the
result of an election as the substance of what is contained in the circular concerning
the candidate.
See also Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944); State v.
Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922); People v. Arnold, 127 Cal. App. 2d 844,
273 P.2d 711 (Super. Ct. 1954). None of these state court holdings has as yet reached the
Supreme Court. But see Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 70 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
94. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960). But cf. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928)
(state registration requirements on oath-bound organizations given to "acts and conduct
inimical to personal rights and public welfare," not merely exercise of speech, upheld).
95. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), 45 VA. L. Rav. 593 (1959).
96. 362 U.S. at 65.
97. In Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. Rys., TRADE REG. REP. 1 69736 (D.D.C. June
6, 1960), the Court held Talley's protection of anonymity not applicable to facts nearly
identical to those of Noerr, reasoning that defendant railroads were in no "danger of in-
timidation or reprisal if their identities in connection with publicity are revealed."
The Talley Court did not say whether a right of anonymity covered commercial speech.
See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942) (police regulation on distribution of advertising handbills upheld), with
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (Douglas, J. concurring) ("Those
who make their living through the exercise of First Amendment rights are no less entitled
to its protection than those whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a profit
motive.").
98. Compare Hays, "Full Disclosure": Dangerous Precedent, 168 NATiox 121, 122
(1949) ("An idea should stand or fall on its own merits. The New Deal was not less desir-
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If some surveillance of anonymous indirect lobbying is felt necessary, the
efficacy of private efforts should not be discounted. Public relations excesses
such as the use of misleading front organizations might be minimized if editors'
or publishers' associations reported the financial backing of organizations re-
sponsible for frequent press releases in lists to be circulated among their mem-
bers.99 Similarly, associations of public relations firms could work privately for
more responsible use of anonymous propaganda.100
able, or more desirable because it was backed, for their own reasons, by Communists."),
with Fly, Full Disclosure: Public Safeguard, 168 NATION 299, 300 (1949) ("Very little
advocacy is in terms of the pure theory of the idea. Per contra, the conclusion is generally
based upon factual 'information.'").
99. Since newspapers are peculiarly susceptible to publicity releases (the editors of
Fortune estimated that nearly half the contents of the nation's better newspapers came from
this source, Fortune, May 1949, p. 67, 69; see Turner, How Pressure Groups Operate,
Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 63, 70), private efforts to inform editors of the sources of gratis
releases would be worthwhile.
100. PniLor, PUBLIc RELATIONS AND A-MERICAN DEMocRAcy 245 (1951).
